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1. Introduction 
The First International Conference on Cognitive 
Technology (CT’95, Hong Kong, 1995) explored a 
radically new way of thinking about the impact computer 
technology has on humans, especially on the human 
mind. Our main aim at that time was a consideration of 
these effects with respect to rendering the interface between 
people and computers more humane. And we exemplified 
our approach by pointing to existing trends and 
tendencies in the vast new loosely organized field of 
research often refared to as ‘HCI’ (‘Human Computer 
Interaction; the replacement for the politically and 
factually “incorrect” MMI, ‘Man Machine Interface’). 
2. Current trends in HCI 
Recent approaches to design in Human Computer 
Interaction, in particular those of Cognitive Engineering 
([55], [58] ,  [73]) Cognitive Ergonomics ([7], [64]), and 
Engineering Psychology ([71], [67]), stress the need for 
tool designs which are characterized by interfaces which 
facilitate better user comprehension of the full effacts of 
their actions on application systems. The goal is to 
optimize the coupling d system performed and user 
performed tasks during complex problem solving. In 
attempting to adapt technological equipment and 
environments to people, the emphasis has been on using 
the psychological profiles of users to determine design 
flaws in order to understand why particular problems in 
user-tool interactions occur. It has been assumed tk 
success in achieving this understanding will lead to mc 
effective HCI design processes which are able to tar$ 
those tasks that map primarily to human cognitive a 
physical capabilities. The intention has been to incres 
overall system performance by eliminating the dissonan 
between natural human capability and the demands 
technologically mediated activity. Consequently, the 
approaches assume that human cognition is establish 
as the basis fiom which technological progress 
launched. 
Cognition oriented approaches to HCI research a 
development have led to a large number af informati 
technology applications which feel good and 
comfortable to use. However, such approaches genera 
fail to adequately integrate directly into the design procl 
a consideration of the negative and undesirable short a 
long term effects these technologies may have on huma 
It is not unreasonable to postulate that the greater ’ 
hct ional  rewards offered by using modern, compu 
mediated tools, the greater the cost in impact we 
humans are likely to pay. These costs have been noted 
several researchers (e.g., [2], [9], [IO], [15], [16], [l 
W I ,  [25l, W I ,  [281, [341, [401, [411, [531, [591, [6 
[65], [66], [68], [69], [72]). Table 1 presents a summ 
of possible costireward tradeoffs. 
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aspect 
place 
identity 
community 
knowledge 
processing speeds 
I during action: games 
I increased visual and acoustic stimulation 
I zapping, blasting, etc.) 
I diminished tactile contact with other human interaction 
rewards ’ costs 
global access to interacting agents 
ease of unconstrained and unchecked intimacy 
with numerous locutors 
new intemational, intercontinental social 
groups 
instant retrievai and storage of vast, 
encyclopedic knowledge 
thought expression: slower interaction frame 
during discourse: e-mail 
& 
thought processing: faster interaction frame 
global displacement of interacting agents 
multiple personality disorders 
local individual isolation and alienation 
epistemic disruption 
diminished coherence and/or depth of interaction 
in natural environments. 
confusion of a gameheality distinction (killing, 
adaptation 
Table 1. The costheward tradeoffs inherent within current advances to information technology. 
beings 
inability to relate to the highly complex but 
weakly deterministic dynamism of natural 
unconscious induction of the relatively 
simplistic but strongly deterministic 
dynamism of computerized environments environments 
3. Humane approach to tool design 
By contrast to the above mentioned trends in HCI, a 
truly humane approach to tool design must take as its 
driving force real human need. It must take into 
consideration the processes (both physical and cognitive) 
by which humans adapt to environments. Thus, the 
focus of design needs to be reversed. Technology must 
be developed to enhance human capabilities rather than 
human capabilities used to condition and inform 
technological development. The differences between these 
points of departure are summarized in table 2. 
3.1 Current Advances in CT 
Cognitive Technology, despite its being a ‘young’ 
discipline, has already made a fkv important claims in 
the domain usually described as ‘HCI’. By putting the 
computer in its place, a human, humanized, and 
necessarily humanizable tool, it simultaneously has put 
the human user in charge, and the interactional horse 
before the technological cart. In this section, we provide 
examples of this approach in theory-informed 
applications within a variety of areas in which C T  has 
had an impact. These include the augmentation of human 
cognitive potential, the alleviation of human 
impairments and handicaps, and interactive leaming. 
Cognitive Technology 
serving the interests of people 
improving human cognitive capacity by means of 
transcending human cognitive closures (= cognitive 
prosthetic) 
investigating ways of how people adapt to the demands of 
technology 
investigating holistic integration between human mental 
processes and technological progress 
Cognitive approaches within HCI 
serving the interests of computing technology or 
academic pursuits of cognitive science or business 
oriented organizations 
improving overall system performance by optimizing 
effectiveness and efficiency of human agents due to 
minimized stress and fatigue and maximized comfort, 
safety, and job satisfaction 
investigating ways of how technology can adapt to the 
demands of people 
investigating dichotomous interactions between human 
mental processes and technological outputs 
Table 2. Different points of departure for CT and HCI 
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3.1.1 Cognitive augmentation 
In his critique of Kantian ([36]) and Whorfian ([70]) 
models of human intelligence, Roger Lindsay has 
suggested that the main advantage of computer 
technology, given its capacity to respond to a real human 
need to amplify cognition, is its capacity to make the 
impossible possible. Due to advances in technology we 
are now in a position to transcend human cognitive limits 
by constructing tools fbr implementing plans whose 
execution takes us beyond the normal reach of our 
cognitive resources. This type d technology has been 
termed cognitive prosthetics. Cognitive prosthetics can 
take various forms, some of which are briefly described 
below. 
Overcoming Impairment 
Developments of concrete C T technologies which 
deal with impairment have aimed at increasing the quality 
of life f a  those individuals which suffer fiom a lack of 
sight, hearing, or full linguistic ability. Notable examples 
are Sylloid - a device which can be used f a  teaching 
syllogistic thinking to the blind ([14]), a TDD - Chinese 
Character Based Telecommunication Device for the Deaf 
([SI) providing an appropriate interactive 
telecommunication service which allows the hearing 
impaired access to information networks, and a 
vibrotactile stimulation device ([48]) for teaching 
linguistically impaired adults to better express 
themselves. This latter device can easily be adopted to the 
leaming of foreign languages. 
Interactive Learning 
A domain which invites little dispute with regard to 
the use d technologies producing desirable mind change 
is education. At the Institute hr the Learning Sciences at 
Northwestem University, USA, in collaboration with the 
University of Chicago, research into and development of 
computer teaching aids, so-called ‘goal-based scenarios’ 
(GBS) ([62]) or ‘leaming support systems for interactions 
with simulated characters’ (Casper) ([37]), have focused 
on restoring students’ desire fbr eff‘ective learning by 
creating environments interesting enough to prompt good 
questions ([61]). At both Yale and John Hopkins 
Universities, USA, planning aids have been implemented 
that collaborate with humans in mixed-initiative 
planning and expert decision making, respectively ([5 1, 
[32]). These systems fall into the C T  paradigm because 
they simulate real life experiences in ways which channel 
users’ attention to purposely made-salient environmental 
cues that positively affect the cognitive processes of 
generating effective action schemas. Creativity 
enhancement in humans as a result cf interacting with 
computer software has also been reported by Calvert et. al. 
m i ;  cf. [31) 
Technology as a cognitive microscope 
A differen< but methodologically related, facet af 
structured learning environment has been proposed b 
Kunii ([39]), who has exploited machine vision i 
teaching the martial art Shorinji Kempo. The underlyin 
assumption has been that the users can easily recognii 
what the computer has brought to a level best suited 6 
human perception. In this system, modem technology 
used to translate video recordings d winning boc 
positions of expert masters (which prevent the aggressor 
smooth and continuous body movement) during real li 
performances into graphical body configurations c 
screens for learners to align themselves with. Tk 
significance of this type of technological intervention 
the leaming process in relation to the aims and objectivl 
of C T  is that it is entirely k e  h m  forming a long li 
dependency relationship between the human user and tl 
available tools, as opposed to, e.g., word processoi 
which are now a sine qua non in generating texts. It sti 
remains unresolved, however, how shortening the time 
master winning techniques will a$ect the nature d tl 
martial arts with respect to the renowned potential 
character formation in those who master them. 
Technology as a tool for the scient@c study 
mind 
of tl 
Studying human computer interaction may help 
explain how human cognition works. Hermann et. 
([33]) have been studying how reminding devices a€fi 
people who use them to keep their appointments. Patter 
observed in their experimental data may shed light 
how the memory of intention in humans is organized. 
3.1.2 Cognitive regression 
While the augmentation of cognition by means 
technology can find concrete expression in the c m t  
products of design, a technology induced regression 
cognition can only be demonstrated by means of metho 
carefully designed to uncover the true nature of t 
integrative processes which occur at the interface of t 
physical with the mental. 
In this connection, progress to date has or 
been noticeable in research which has brought attention 
a large number of perceivable inter- and intra-persol 
behavioral “symptoms” (listed in table 1) that peol 
have been noticed to exhibit as a result of fiequt 
exposure to tool use. Turkle ([68, 691) and Slouka ([6 
have provided ample evidence showing that playi 
computer games and surfing on the Intemet can lead 
serious personality disorders, which in tum ai??& socie 
infrastructures. Janney ([34]) has pointed out that 
unwarranted degree cf intimacy, Eu exceeding the nom 
threshold, often rapidly develops between total strang 
due to the ease with which we can now establish contac 
and communicate without restrictions, over the e-m, 
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David Good ([ 15,161) conjectures that one reason fbr this 
phenomenon is an ever diminishing authority and control 
of the speakerhearer over how technology structures the 
environment, in particular those aspects of normative 
social interaction which at%& the contexts under which 
interpretative communication occurs. In particular, the 
elimination of the physical cues which establish the 
intended meanings that normally exist in fawtef8Ce 
communication, has a profound efket on how humans 
now develop pragmatic mechanisms for dealing with 
incomplete information. Thus, hr example, what may 
appear beneficial in academic polemics in 
quote/commenting over the e-mail (since exact verbal 
expressions are delivered and processed closer to the 
natural speed of thought ([30])), proves to be detrimental 
to personal ‘virtual partnerships’ formation and 
maintenance. 
Problems also arise when the computer technology 
plays the role of an equal partner in group 
communication. Roberts ([59]) has gathered experimental 
evidence for an earlier observation ([72], [17]) that a label 
such as ‘expert systems’ (which carries the entailment af 
‘knowing better’ than some lay user) have a disruptive 
bearing on how humans engage in conversation. The 
communication impedance caused by computerized tools 
mediating human interactions has been discussed by 
Eisenhardt and Littman ([9]), who explain that this occurs 
because computers lack the human capacity to detect 
potential communication failures before they arise. 
Claims d apparent gains to humans such as 1) 
increased natural readability due to hypertext ([45]) and 
text-to-speech conversion systems ([40]), and 2) increased 
skills in self-expression due to Electronic Argumentation 
Environments ([65]) have been found premature and not 
fully supported by empirical data. Kirkeby and Malmborg 
([38]) have wondered whether different degrees of 
immersion in multi-media technology, ranging fiom 
interactive systems to full-blown virtual realities that 
support different mental processes, can each destroy the 
cognitive effects that the other has produced. The 
skepticism culminates in Biocca’s ([2:71]) pertinent 
question regarding the ‘teleological’ orientation of the 
intelligence augmentation hypotheses postulated by 
researchers in VR labs around the world: if “ ... we hardly 
know what “intelligence” is, how can we hope to 
“augment” it?” 
4. Towards a unified theory of adaptation 
The issues pertaining to the products d design 
cannot be considered disjointedly h m  the processes by 
which design occurs. Rather, one is always informed by 
the other. This particular interrelationship comes about 
due to the dialectic nature of the adaptive process ([49], 
[25]). Our mind, via its outputs, fabricates and changes its 
own environment in order to decrease the complexity of 
the problems we have to deal with ([18, 431) and to 
execute otherwise impossible plans; the fabricated 
environment, in its turn, recursively conditions the mind. 
While in the human processes of externalization and 
intemalization everything comes together, fbr 
methodological reasons these two types of processes 
constitute related but distinct areas of investigation. To 
this eff‘ect, Gorayska and Marsh ([22]) have proposed to 
reserve the term Cognitive Technology to & to 
methodological matters of tool design, and proposed the 
term Technological Cognition (TC) to refer to theoretical 
explorations of the ways in which tool use a&c& the 
formation of human intemal mechanisms that govern the 
way humans behave and think. 
Our primary concem is thus with the identification, 
mapping, and evaluation of the relationship between 
technological products and the processes by which our 
cognitive structures adapt through exposure to the 
heuristics goveming the highly ordered information 
structures of an intensely technological environment. a 
particular interest to us is how the mind becomes a 
product of the tasks it performs and the technological 
resources it exploits, i.e. how it becomes technologized in 
ways not necessarily beneficial to the humans themselves. 
A unified theoretical M e w o r k  fbr empirical 
investigation into the processes of mental and physical 
adaptation has to integrate several conceptually connected 
phenomena which up to this day have only received 
separate treatment. Our own work on the issues now 
brought together under the umbrella of Cognitive 
Technology began with the Fabricated World Hypothesis 
af Gorayska and Lindsay ([ 18,43]), who postulated that 
the ways in which people structure their habitats have 
major influence on which cognitive mechanisms may 
operate inside of those habitats. In their paper they 
conjectured that structured habitats are extemalizations af 
human memory which serve two major purposes: they 
facilitate simple but sufficient algorithms for dealing with 
the complexities of the material world; at the same time 
they act as reminders fbr intention directed behavior. 
That is, the spatial and organizational relations between 
objects present in those habitats dictate which goals are to 
be pursued and which plans-action sets will effectively 
achieve them. It follows fiom the Fabricated World 
Hypothesis that, if the human mind and the extemal 
world are interrelated in intricate and inseparable ways, 
the structure given to the human fabricated environment 
must have a profound influence on the organization of the 
mind. This thesis has since become one of the major areas 
for explorations in CT ([24]) 
We speculate that the orientation cf human habitats 
towards hnctional goals supports people in the generation 
and recovery of problem spaces which comprise elements 
interconnected by relevance relationships ([ 181, [ 191, 
[2 I]). The cognitive mechanism fbr processing relevance 
relationships, (conceptualized as a relevance meta- 
function) provides an interface between motivation, 
situation, and action systems (cf. [35]). It is understood to 
be responsible for goveming how unconscious motivation 
is cognized, how extemal situations are perceived, and 
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how effectively our sensori-motor movements are 
integrated with these two seemingly independent 
contexts. 
The processing of relevance is closely linked to the 
phenomena of attention and extemal priming ([22]). 
Attention and external priming are dnven by both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic communication. When 
communicating, people perform pragmatic acts ([5 l]), i.e. 
they purposely set up scenarios which increase the 
probability of some intended events - the so called ‘take 
ups’ by targeted participants in a dialogue - to occur. 
Pragmatic acts are therefore a behavioral equivalent of the 
fabrication of extemal reality. The analogy can be further 
extended to include natural language as a spontaneously 
evolving technology which extemalizes the mind, 
amplifying and, at the same time, constraining its intemal 
operations ([25], [27], [42], [29]). 
Within psychology, two frameworks have been 
proposed which are pertinent to the above issues: 
Ecological Perception ([ 121) and Symbol Grounding 
([30]). With respect to the former, Gibson argued that 
within a perceivable extemal reality only a finite set of 
experiences are possible. He conceived that human 
perception involves two interrelated processes: recognition 
of the invariant properties of objects in unstable 
environments and recognition of the actions these objects 
can afford However, he claimed that it is possible to 
understand human perception without considering 
linguistic and cultural mediation. Hence, he rejected any 
link between perception and mental representation, 
postulating that mentation is purely reactive and occurs as 
a direct exposure of the mind to its environment. 
Hamad [30] calls into question the purely reactive, 
Gibsonian way of perceiving the invariant properties of 
perceivable extemal objects. For him every act of 
symbolically mediated perceiving needs to be ‘grounded’, 
that is the representations of our perceptions must have 
some ultimate foundation in invariant properties. This 
symbol grounding problem, as he calls it, can only be 
solved by examining cognitive processes by means of 
which the invariant properties of objects are picked out, 
and which are incorporated as an integral part of 
categorical perception mediated by language. As Hamad is 
mainly concemed with how natural language expressions 
come to be properly understood, he does not extend his 
theory beyond the relationship of language to the extemal 
world. However, this provides no explanation for how 
affordances a@& the selective recognition OF invariants. 
Consequently, researchers who have taken on the symbol 
grounding problem, when dealing with the question of 
how (basic) concepts are intemally formed, are guilty of a 
similar omission (e.g., [54]). 
While Hamad has directed attention to the intemal 
perceptual processes necessary for dealing with the 
invariants of objects, the internal dynamics goveming the 
perception and recognition of these objects’ ai3ordance 
potential remains unresolved. Here, Gibsonian theory may 
help. What is needed is an empirically viable, process- 
oriented footing on which to base Gibson’s &ordanc 
theory. This need begins to be addressed by Brook 
([4]), who advocates a ‘subsumption model’ fc 
meaningful perceptual interpretation without intemi 
representation, which is basically Gibsonian in naturc 
However, affordana perception cannot be considered a 
simply passive and deterministic (the lectio passima ( 
the Gibsonian model). Affordances must be envisioned z 
virtual structures that can be recovered in ways suitable fc 
human perception and cognition. Structures whic 
mediate in human interaction with the extemal world. 
It is not surprising that the computer science and P 
community, rather than accept the ‘natural’, ecologici 
model proposed by Gibson, adopted the cognitik 
framework proposed by Marr ([46]). Marr, unlike Gibsoi 
provided a procedural dimension for dealing with an 
testing simulated models of visual perception. T o  eck 
Hamad’s argument for the symbol grounding problem, 
is not enough simply to know what &ordances can 1 
perceived in interactive environments (as discussed 1 
e.g., [57], [ll]). Nor is it enough to know what the 
nature may be (namely, individual attributes of extem 
objects) and how they are distributed in pragmatic modi 
of representation ([35]) .  What we have to establish fir 
and foremost is how those affordances are actively reifie 
both in the material and the cognitive world. 
4.1 The affordance activation problem 
Highly dynamic environments rely on invaria 
characteristics which are perceived as constant. Accordii 
to Gibson, these invariants reside in optic arra 
accessible to sensory inputs of a (moving) perceivii 
agent. Morphing of multiple views of objects in the 
environments allows us to pick up the invariants with 
them. Hence, invariants are relational. A single instance 
viewing cannot and does not facilitate establishii 
invariants as characteristic features of external objec 
Negative and positive feedback is necessary to redo1 
the choice of affordable invariants. But where do the 
affordances reside and how do they emerge? 
We believe that the extemal world provides only 
potential for affordance (cf. [ 1 13); that affordance is neitk 
unique nor complete. Mordance potential also exists 
individual perceiving agents. Upon contact with t 
&ordance potential in the environment the affordar 
potential in the individual perceiving agents reifies t 
affordance. This leads to the construction of a meaning 
action trigger. Action, in tum, has a recursive &xt 
motivational states and the environment. The affordar 
activation problem is thus an instance of how relevar 
relations (comprising fine tuned complexes of goa 
actions, and perceived objects) come to be determini 
intemalized, recursively modified, and extemalized 
living organisms in order to ensure their self-regulati 
equilibria. 
Let’s go back for one moment to the relevance me 
function that we introduced earlier. And let’s supp‘ 
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Mer that we indeed are able to define and handle an 
archetypal relevance meta-function, both conceptually and 
procedurally. That would mean that we could establish 
the relevance of the internal processes that steer 
motivational states and environments, as well as the 
necessary interaction between the two, and that 
furthermore, we are able to procedurally determine the 
vectors controlling those processes. 
The question then arises: Doing this, have we 
established a working C T  model? Vice versa, will this 
conceptual arrangement affect our vision of C T, and how? 
Will it become fruitful for tool design? And so on. 
In particular, the question needs to be raised whether 
such knowledge, combined with its applications, will 
allow us to answer some important empirical questions, 
such as the ones listed below (see also [28]): 
1. 
2. 
Which manifestations of evolutionary mind change 
can be monitored? 
Does the process of human mental adaptation vary 
significantly with respect to natural andor highly 
technological environments? If so, in what ways? 
What kinds of evidence can help find the answers to 
questions 1 and 2 above? and 
What methods and practices are appropriate to gather 
this evidence? 
3. 
4. 
It goes without saying that the notion d 
relevance as discussed here, cannot properly be situated in 
a societal context without appealing to concepts such as 
control (whoever is in power decides on relevance) ethics 
(whose relevance is more relevant: that of the producer or 
of the user of technology), and the all-encompassing issue 
of locating relevance in the conditions goveming our 
cognition and its use through environmental awareness. 
We have touched upon these matters in earlier 
publications ([17], [27], [41], [50],[53], [63]). 
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